A network run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) is responsible for a string of attacks on Jewish and Israeli sites in Western countries, Israel’s intelligence agency announced.

The operation is led by senior IRGC-QF commander Sardar Ammar, who is alleged to command around 11,000 operatives across Europe, Australia and beyond.

According to the agency, the network intensified activity after the October 7 2023 Hamas attack on southern Israel and has since carried out vandalism, arson and reconnaissance aimed at Jewish communal institutions and Israeli-owned businesses.

Among the incidents cited are the firebombing of the Adass Israel synagogue in Melbourne and the kosher restaurant Lewis’ Continental Kitchen in Sydney in 2024, arson attacks on a hotel and a synagogue in Athens in July 2024, and surveillance operations in Berlin in mid-2025.

The Israeli agency emphasises that the intention of the network is not merely property damage but to intimidate Jewish communities, sow fear and establish conditions for potentially more serious violent attacks.

It describes the method used as one of “terror without Iranian fingerprints” — recruiting non-Iranian operatives and criminal gangs to mask Tehran’s role, including through complex proxy-structures.

The Australian government, having already expelled Iran’s ambassador in Canberra and begun the process of designating the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, welcomed Israel’s statement as further validation of its assessment.

Canada and the United States are among other nations that have recently documented Iranian-linked plots against Jewish and Israeli targets.

In response, Iran firmly denied the allegations and has condemned them as politically motivated, while the IRGC has dismissed the international scrutiny as part of a broader campaign to isolate Tehran.

Intelligence analysts say the disclosure marks a significant escalation in how states are publicly naming individuals responsible for transnational terror networks, and could increase pressure on Tehran’s diplomatic and intelligence apparatus.

The naming of Sardar Ammar and the publication of his network’s alleged global reach place the spotlight on how the IRGC-QF may now be balancing its Middle-East proxy strategy with direct influence operations in Western countries.

For the Jewish and Israeli-scene communities impacted in Europe and Australia, the public attribution represents both a vindication of long-standing concerns and a new phase of threat assessment.

As Western governments step up coordination with Israel and share intelligence on Jewish-target plots, the degree to which their responses match the scale of the threat remains to be seen.

The Israeli disclosure has set in motion potential further prosecutions, diplomatic responses and counter-terrorism cooperation tied to Iran’s overseas operations.